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D1scoVERY-D1scr.osURB OF TRADE SECRETS IN ToRT AcnoN-Prior to trial
of suit to recover damages for hand infection alleged to have been caused by
the use of defendant's washing compound, plaintiff filed interrogatories requesting the ingredients and proportions used in the compound. Defendant's offer
to divulge its secret formula to the court in confidence until the plaintiff should
make a prima facie case was ruled upon adversely by the court. Defendant
thereupon suffered the statutory penalty of default1 rather than disclose the
secret. Held, default judgment affirmed. In this instance trade secrets were
not privileged, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order to
disclose since plaintiff's further attempt at establishment of a prima facie case
depended upon learning the formula of the compound. Putney v. DuBois Co.,
(Mo. App. 1950) 226 S.W. (2d) 737.
The principal case presents a problem which courts have not been able to
solve without possibility of hardship resulting to at least one of the parties.2
The law has long deemed a trade secret a valuable property right entitled to
its protection, but the well recognized, if inconsistent, right of a litigant to have
disclosed all facts necessary to his case is given priority in a proper situation.8
The principal case is one of the few tort cases in which this problem has arisen.4
The refusal of a party to disclose his trade secrets is more frequently encountered
in patent and trademark infringement suits, and in suits to enjoin disclosure of
secret processes surreptitiously obtained. Each case is treated as a separate problem, and no rules can be drawn to £.t every case other thaa. the recognition that
there is no absolute privilege against disclosure of trade secrets.ls However, the
danger of bad faith and "fishing expeditions" by a business competitor requesting disclosure is less in the tort than in the patent cases. In the patent cases the
situation is made more difficult in that the party seeking disclosure is the person
from whom it is primarily desired to keep the information. If the court suspects
that the claim of privilege is a mere pretext, or that the party seeking disclosure
is doing so merely to learn his competitor's secrets, an order for disclosure will
l Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1949) §847.89(d). For procedure elsewhere see note by
Prof. Wigmore, 19 h.L. L. REv. 594 (1925). •
2 In several other cases one party has voluntarily lost his case rather than divulge his
secret, and in Wilson v. Superior Ct., 66 Cal. App. 275, 225 P. 881 (1924) petitioner
went to jail for contempt rather than disclose.
s Wilson v. Superior Ct., supra note 2; Grasselli Chemical Co. v. National Aniline &
Chemical Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 282 F. 379. For protection of trade secrets generally
see Barton, "A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets," 13 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 507 (1939).
4 Spain v. U.S. Rubber Co., 94 N.H. 400, 54 A. (2d) 364 (1947) (dermatitis contracted from secret cement); Drake v. Herrman, 261 N.Y. 414, 185 N.E. 685 (1933) and·
Lenerts v. Rapidol Distributing Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 3 F.R.D. 42 (injuries from secret
hair dye); Hillick v. E. W. Edward & Son, 143 Misc. 277, 256 N.Y.S. 313 (1932)
(injuries from secret depilatory cream); State ex rel. Schuleter Mfg. Co. v. Beck, 337 Mo.
839, 85 S.W. (2d) 1026 (1935) (occupational disease contracted in paint shop where
secret processes were being used); Wilson v. Superior Ct., supra note 2 (explosion of secret
fireworks).
5 8 WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2212 (1940) and numerous cases therein cited.
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be denied. 6 The court will require more than a mere suspicion that disclosure
will aid the party's cause, and perhaps will deny it if substituted evidence will
1.-uffice.7 Nor will disclosure be ordered before it appears that the secret information will be absolutely necessary to the case8• For this reason disclosure through
pre-trial depositions or interrogatories may be more restricted than disclosure
through testimony at the trial itself. 9 Also, opportunity for control by the court
to prevent undue publicity and hardship is probably greater at the trial than in
pre-trial procedure,10 although some use may be made of a referee in the case
of pre-trial depositions.11 In recent years statutes, including the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, have greatly broadened opportunity for pre-trial discovery. Under the old equity bill of discovery a party was entitled to information which would give him evidence to establish his own case, but was not
entitled to information relating to his opponent's case for purposes of convenience
and to prevent surprise. Under the new statutes discovery is permitted for both
purposes,12 but, by statutory or judicial limitation, discovery of trade secrets is
not permitted any more readily than under the old procedure. 13 In the principal case, since the secret information was necessary to show causation between
the use of the compound and the injury, plaintiff's request for disclosure was
not based merely upon convenience, and is therefore justified.

Cleaveland]. Rice, S.Ed.

6 Claude Neon Lights v. Rainbow Light, (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 31 F. (2d) 988; Steinfur
Patents Corp. v. Moos Fur Dyeing Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 813.
7 Drake v. Herrman, supra note 4; Shimadzu v. Electric Storage Battery Co., (D.C.
Pa. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 393. But see Billick v. E. W. Edward & Son, supra note 4. Why
the formula in the principal case should not have been analyzed by plaintiff's experts was
not discussed.
,
s Eibel Process Co. v. Remington-Martin Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1912) 197 F. 760.
9Westem States Machine Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 1 F.R.D.
766; Steinfur Patents Corp. v. Moos Fur Dyeing Corp., supra note 6.
10 Interrogatories are returned to the opposing party whereas the court alone may hear
the secret information at the trial itself in a proper situation. See Federal Rule 33 and the
procedure used in Wiggins Chemical Co. v. Berry, (C.C.A. 7th, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 622.
11 Burns v. Hayes, 193 Misc. 501, 84 N.Y.S. (2d) 277 (1948). See also McLeod
Tire Corp. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 268 F. 205.
12 SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE, 2d ed.,
c. I, §l (1941).
13 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended to 1947, rules 26(b), 30(b),
30(d) and 3l(d); Lever Bros. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., (D.C. Md. 1941) 38 F.
Supp. 680.

